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The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has emerged as a key organ of 
governance and management of the globalising world economy. Its 
establishment as a forum for continuous negotiations on a range of trade and 
trade-related issues is creating new challenges for African countries.  An 
essential requirement of participation in the trade regime under the WTO is 
more rapid investment and overall economic growth by securing better 
market access for products. For African countries, this can be possible only if 
they can participate more effectively in the design and enforcement of trade 
rules as well as strengthening the institutional mechanism that shapes the 
trade regime on appropriate terms.  This article explores the question of why 
African countries’ participation in the WTO has been marginal and suggests 




The need to build Africa’s capacity and its participation in WTO meetings and 
related fora has been iterated for long. It has been established that many African 
countries cannot participate effectively in the WTO due to their limited capacity in 
finance and human resources. 
 
The situation needs urgent help and action. Many African countries, which are 
members of the WTO, do not have a mission in Geneva, where the WTO is 
located. Even countries those that do have a mission in Geneva do not have the 
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required capacity. For instance, Congo had only one WTO official, Côte d’Ivoire 
two, Zimbabwe four, Ghana two, Mali none, and Senegal two.  Furthermore, all of 
these had very limited assistance or none at all from their capitals or back-up 
research teams. 
 
There are three core sets of competencies required for effective participation at the 
WTO process. First, a country’s delegation in Geneva should be skilled in 
negotiations and diplomacy, as it is a country’s arrowhead in pursuing national 
interests in the WTO.  Secondly, is the requirement of having key staff in national 
capitals with analytical and policy-making skills to provide operational support 
and guidance to the trade delegation in Geneva. Finally, there are requirements for 
personnel with technical, legal, political and legislative skills in trade policy 
institutions for effective participation of a country in the WTO process. 
 
The WTO is a member-driven organisation.  It has a wide and growing mandate 
therefore active participation of trade delegates is essential for its work. Among 
others, the WTO’s activities include about fifty meetings and consultations per 
week.  This requires a large, skilled and versatile delegation in Geneva. A 
country’s capacity also depends on the significance of learning by doing and the 
development of institutional memory. These attributes get diluted in inadequately 
sized delegations, which may also undergo frequent changes in staff composition. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The establishment and functioning of the WTO is best understood through regime 
theory. Defining regimes simply in terms of explicit rules and procedures risks 
formalism, i.e. purely nominal agreements could be considered to be a regime, 
even though they had no behavioural implications.  International regimes are 
defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.  In an international society, faced with issues transcending 
the physical and political limits of nation-states, any analysis of international 
politics should be centred on issues of global governance. 
 
Regimes can occur in a given area of international relations according to the 
notion that international politics can be sub-divided. In a pluralistic society all 
individuals find their lives encompassed by many over-lapping issue-areas.  Each 
issue area can have, even if analogous, its own governance structure as a result of 
interaction of interests and powers at stake. Power in the trade issue-area, for 
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example, is not consistent with an elite theory model: the largest traders tend to 
have the greatest influence, while countries important in other domains have little 
influence. 
 
The question is why should one then bother about the WTO? On the one hand, its 
existence would be pointless if states feel free to do as they please, or if small 
states simply follow the rules announced by large states. On the other hand, the 
WTO as an organisation is not the sole source of order in the global trading 
system. 
 
The answer lies in a number of reasons for why regimes should matter. There are 
two categories of international regimes. First, those having significant powers, 
tightly controlled by states and limited in their ability to extend their authority to 
other areas. The second category consists of those which are not tightly controlled 
but have limited powers. The WTO falls in the first category, while organisations 
like the World Health Organisation fall into the second. 
 
The criticism of regime theory hinges on its specificity of legal rules and the 
broader structure of an international system. In today’s world, structural power is 
exercised through technology, market domination and the financial system.  Large 
corporations take decisions, which either extend or restrict the range of choices 
available to sovereign governments over their economic development. Thus, the 
power over outcomes in international political economy cannot be limited to that 
exercised by governments only. Structural power counts more than relational 
power. This notion goes beyond the state-centric tradition that characterises the 
regime theory. 
 
With respect to the trade-regime, critics of regime theory argued that bargaining 
and trade negotiations are related to power and thus, called for the empowerment 
of trade negotiators and trade officials in the political system. In this respect, the 
following perspectives of empowerment are important: 
¾ Personal: developing a sense of self and individual confidence and 
capacity, and undoing the effects of internalised oppression. 
¾ Relational: developing the ability to negotiate and influence the nature of a 
relationship and decisions made within it. 
¾ Collectiveness: where individuals work together to achieve a greater 
impact than each could have done alone. This includes involvement in 
political structures, but might also cover collective action based on co-
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operation rather than competition. Collective action may be locally focused 
or more institutionalised as happens in the United Nations or the WTO. 
 
African countries’ participation in the global trade regime under the WTO should 
be analysed by taking into account these perspectives of empowerment. 
 
THE REALITIES 
To date, Africa has derived minimal benefits from the multilateral trading system 
under the auspices of the WTO. Africa’s participation in the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations was very minimal.  A study by the African 
Economic Research Consortium revealed that the participation of African 
countries in the rules-making exercises during the WTO ministerial conferences 
was marginal, largely because these countries lacked the capacity to engage 
substantively on a wide range of issues on the agenda.  They were overwhelmed 
by the complexities of negotiations and lacked negotiating experience and 
expertise in economic policy analyses and international trade law. A case in point 
was their inability to seek credit during negotiations for measures already 
undertaken under Structural Adjustment Programmes that included trade reforms. 
 
African countries had seldom chosen to "bind tariffs" even though they could have 
received negotiation credits for having done so, as some Latin American countries 
did.  Furthermore, the focus of African countries was on preserving or enhancing 
the generalised system of preferences (GSP) or Lome Convention’s Tariff 
Preference, not fully appreciating that in the long run these provisions would have 
to be WTO compliant. 
 
A key factor behind the unbalanced nature of the Uruguay Round agreements has 
been the unequal negotiating power of members. Even today, there is not much 
change in the situation. Many developing and least developed countries are under-
represented, or even totally unrepresented, in the day-to-day activities of the 
WTO.  The WTO procedures rely on consensus for decision-making but, in 
practice, smaller countries cannot wield a veto and are therefore effectively 
disenfranchised. Much is decided in a multitude of committees, where many 
developing countries even if they could attend, would be outmanoeuvred 
technically and politically. Furthermore, there are approximately fifty WTO 
meetings a week, meaning that even when developing countries are represented in 
Geneva, they cannot participate in many discussions relevant to their countries’ 
trade interest. 
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Another appalling situation is regarding trade policy making in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For many countries, it is not well defined and, more often than not, several 
ministries and institutions handle trade policy issues. The situation becomes much 
more complex when dealing with issues of multilateral negotiations, where both 
political and commercial diplomacy are involved. This brings in the ministry of 
foreign affairs and at times in some countries, the process of multilateral 
negotiation is conducted mainly through the ministry of foreign affairs. 
 
Participation is likely to be weaker if foreign ministry officials are not aware of the 
issues. For example, the participation of Kenya in the Uruguay Round has been 
described by local policymakers as lacking in commitment and displaying an 
apathetic attitude towards the negotiations.  They further note that representation 
at the ambassadorial level did not provide the needed technical competence and 
the specialisation required for negotiations. 
 
A civil servant from Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and Industry represented the 
country at the WTO meetings. In other countries, trade policy matters are dealt 
through the ministry of trade but decisions are cleared through the cabinet. Since 
implementation of trade policies is through various ministries, co-ordination is 
often problematic.  There are significant differences between Sub-Saharan African 
countries regarding the location of real, as compared to nominal, authority with 
respect to articulation and implementation of trade policy. 
 
Also, there are differences in terms of which institution has the responsibility for 
trade policy and which government agency has the power to negotiate and sign 
international agreements. For example, in Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce has a role in trade policy matters but does not appear to have the 
eminence. It is the Industrial Tariff Committee, which advises the Ministry of 
Finance in setting tariffs and other import surcharges as well as the granting of 
tariff exemptions. 
 
In Senegal, trade measures are generally the subject of consultation among a host 
of ministries and departments and the Ministry of Trade, in principle, serves as the 
co-ordinator. In reality, however, the Ministry of Finance assumes control with 
respect to tax-related matters.  Since trade taxes constitute a major component of 
the national budget, the Ministry of Finance in effect assumes a major role in trade 
policy formation and implementation. In countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, the same pattern prevails. 
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Africa’s Plight in the International Economic System 
‘According to a report of the World Bank, Africa’s share of world commodity 
trade has fallen as a result of wrong-headed policies. For example, high tariff 
barriers made inputs expensive and added to production costs. That path 
proved an expensive failure. 
If Africa had maintained its share of world trade from the late 1960s, its 
exports and income would be some $70bn higher today. But another statistic 
stands out from the report. Agricultural subsidies in the developed industrial 
member states of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) total $300bn a year, which is equal to Africa’s entire annual 
income. 
No single measure to assist Africa’s battle to recover would provide a greater 
incentive, and have a greater impact, than reducing this support and opening 
up this market for African products. Lower tariffs on processed agricultural 
products would be an important benefit, making it easier for African countries 
to add value to their natural products, and improving prospects for agro-
industry. 
Change is under way. There is recognition of the need for greater transparency 
in government, and general acceptance of market-driven prices and exchange 
rates. But it is also critical to help Africa to negotiate WTO regulations, and 
then to apply them. Rules seen to be imposed by an alien organisation will 
never be enacted with enthusiasm. 
Africa’s recovery is a two-way process. The biggest challenge is at home. Good 
governance is critical. Giving them better access to the developed world’s 
markets is an urgent and essential step. 
                             Source: Financial Times, London, UK;  1.6.2000 
 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the situation of the African trade missions in Geneva. It is 
important to keep in mind that these figures provide a rough approximation of the 
number of officials actually available to work directly on WTO issues.  The vast 
majority of them are obliged to spend some of their time with other international 
organisations in Geneva and thus cannot dedicate more time to activities in the 
WTO.  Several delegations have personnel whose principal functions involve 
support activities (communication, accounting etc) but are occasionally called 
upon to cover WTO meetings during busy periods and perhaps only with a 
listening brief. 
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Table 1. African Trade Missions in Geneva, Switzerland 
No. Country Number of  
Represenatives1 
Population2 GDP/Capita3
1 Angola 3 12.1 523 
2 Benin 0 5.8 405 
3 Botswana 0 1.6 6 103 
 4 Burkina Faso 0 11.3 249 
5 Burundi 2 6.5 149 
6 Cameroon 3 14.3 1 474 
7 Central African Republic 0 3.5 340 
8 Chad 0 7.3 231 
9 Congo 2 2.8 995 
10 Côte d’Ivoire 2 14.3 1 598 
11 Democratic Republic of Congo 1 49.1 124 
12 Djibouti 1 0.6 757 
13 Gabon 2 1.2 6 353 
14 Gambia 0 1.2 1 453 
15 Ghana 3 19.2 1 735 
16 Guinea 2 7.3 573 
17 Guinea Bissau 0 1.2 173 
18 Kenya 3 29.0 980 
19 Lesotho 1 2.1 485 
20 Madagascar 3 15.1 231 
21 Malawi 0 10.4 169 
22 Mali 0 10.7 264 
23 Mauritania 1 2.5 478 
24 Mauritius 5 1.1 8 312 
25 Mozambique 0 18.9 169 
26 Namibia 0 1.7 5 176 
27 Niger 0 10.1 216 
28 Nigeria 6 106.4 795 
29 Rwanda 3 6.6 279 
30 Senegal 2 9.0 1 307 
31 Sierra Leone 0 4.6 160 
32 Swaziland 0 1.0 3 816 
33 Tanzania 5 32.1 173 
34 Togo 0 4.4 337 
35 Uganda 5 20.6 338 
36 Zambia 4 8.8 427 
37 Zimbabwe 4 11.4 3 669 
Note: 1) Number of representatives (as of August 2001); 2) In million and data for 1998;  
3) In 1995 US dollars and data for 1998 
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Many African countries (fifteen in total) do not have a resident delegate in Geneva 
and four maintain one-person offices. For example, in one mission, four people 
spent 100 percent of their time on WTO work, and in two others there were two 
delegates who spent 95-100 per cent of their time on WTO work. In five missions, 
the figures were 40 and 80 percent, with the number of full time equivalent 
officials ranging from 0.75-2.1 (compared to two or three officials as mentioned in 
the directory). Finally, in two delegations the range was from 10-25 percent, i.e. 
each of them was giving only one quarter of the full time equivalent person 
working on WTO matters. 
 
Priority subject areas were: the Committee on Trade and Development, as listed 
by nine out of eleven delegates; market access and agriculture were mentioned by 
eight; and the Committee on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) and dispute settlement were mentioned by six. 
 
Moreover, virtually all of the Sub-Saharan African missions in Geneva are staffed 
by officials from the ministry of foreign affairs rather than from the ministry of 
commerce and trade. That is, they are staffed by people who have little or nothing 
to do with WTO matters when they return to their homeland. This means not only 
do they know nothing about WTO work when they arrive, but that the WTO 
experience they gain while in Geneva is not likely to be used when they return 
home. 
 
Any meaningful effort to improve the participation of Sub-Saharan African 
countries in the WTO must deal with this problem. An interesting example comes 
from the list of officials who were selected by their countries to attend the trade 
policy course in Geneva, 2001. Togo selected a customs officer, Ghana, a civil 
servant, Benin a tax officer. These officials play a very little role in the 
implementation of trade policies in their countries and this means that they go 
home with little to put back into the system. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The WTO agreements and their operation are and will have a profound impact on 
the economies of African countries. Hence, it is imperative that they do not remain 
indifferent and handicapped, but actively participate in the negotiations and other 
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The current process of being pushed into making one-sided concessions or facing 
a sudden collapse at the end should naturally be changed to one of engaging in a 
meaningful negotiation of give and take and insisting on commensurate 
concessions from others before finally agreeing to any concession from one’s own 
side. Opposition and resistance to harmful proposals is legitimate, and whenever a 
decision is taken to yield, it should be done in a proper and planned manner, after 
negotiating for commensurate concessions from the beneficiaries of the proposal. 
Thus, the need for effective regional alliances arises. 
 
All this requires the support of a detailed analytical examination of the issues 
involved and identification of interests. The African Group should undertake such 
an examination, but their capacity is limited. They should build and strengthen 
their capacity through empowerment schemes. The universities and institutions in 
their countries could sponsor this work. A network of institutions in developing 
countries should be formed for this purpose. But considering the limited resources 
and capacity in these nations, it is doubtful if they will be able to undertake studies 
and analyses of their own, and on a sustained basis. 
 
Earlier, particularly during the Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) undertook technical assistance programmes to help empower the 
developing countries in the negotiations. UNCTAD is still engaged in studying the 
subjects and issues relating to the WTO, but its work in this area is mainly centred 
on the inter-governmental meetings. 
 
By taking into account the political economy of regime and empowerment theories 
and the situation as described above, the following recommendations are made for 
effective participation of African countries in the WTO. First, they have to identify 
specific interests and objectives in respect of the subjects of the WTO. This can be 
done through a broad-based and in-depth examination of the issues and 
implications. It also requires some institutional changes in the decision-making 
process. WTO matters are complex with widespread implications and any 
particular ministry in a government would not be fully equipped to handle them. 
Almost every issue being taken up in the WTO involves different interests of 
various wings of the government. They also involve a c1ash of interests among 
various industry groups and economic operators. These subjects demand a very 
comprehensive examination of their implications and the balancing of differing 
interests. A government ministry working in the traditional manner is hardly 
equipped to perform this task. 
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Secondly, it is necessary to have a permanent expert body of high standing 
credibility and objectivity to supplement the efforts of the current machinery. This 
body should examine the issues critically, taking into account all aspects and 
interests, and should hold wide consultations with the affected groups in trade and 
industry, consumer fora, various wings of the government and other interested 
groups and persons. 
 
Thirdly, there should be a change in the African countries’ strategy and approach. 
The current feeling of helplessness, that they cannot have their say in the WTO, 
should be replaced by a perception that they can achieve their objectives if a 
number of them are united and well prepared. Developing countries make up a 
very large number in the WTO and even if one does not expect all of them to 
come together on all the issues, one can at least expect a large number of them to 
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